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A spatial welfare framework for the analysis of the spatial dimensions of sustainability 
is developed. It incorporates agglomeration effects, interregional trade, negative 
environmental externalities and various land use categories. The model is used to 
compare rankings of spatial configurations according to evaluations based on social 
welfare and ecological footprint indicators. Five spatial configurations are considered 
for this purpose. The exercise is operationalized with the help of a two-region model of 
the economy that is in line with the ‘new economic geography’. Various (counter) 
examples show that the footprint method is not consistent with an approach aimed at 
maximum social welfare. 
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 I.  INTRODUCTION 
In  the  large  literature  on  sustainability  and  sustainable  development,  the  aspect  of  spatial 
sustainability  has  not  received  much  attention  (Toman  1994;  Pezzey  and  Toman  2005). 
Moreover, the literature on trade and environment refrains from dynamic sustainability issues. 
As a result, a firm basis for thinking about the sustainable development of regions, sustainable 
transport, sustainable location policy and sustainable trade policy is lacking. Here we offer 
such a basis, by performing a welfare analysis of alternative spatial configurations in a spatial 
economy with environmental pressure, land use, trade advantages and agglomeration effects. 
  The ecological footprint (EF hereafter) was proposed by Wackernagel and Rees (1996) 
as suitable to address questions about spatial sustainability.  It has, however, been severely 
criticized on several grounds (e.g. Levett 1998; van den Bergh and Verbruggen 1999; Ayres 
2000; Costanza 2000; van Kooten and Bulte 2000; Opschoor 2000; Lenzen and Murray 2001; 
Ferng 2002; Jorgensen, Vigsoe, Krisoffersen, and Rubin 2002). Notwithstanding its structural 
weaknesses, it has become a widely used indicator for assessing environmental sustainability. 
It has in fact been used to calculate the environmental sustainability performance of many 
nations, regions, cities, populations (e.g., Lenzen and Murray 2001; McDonald and Patterson 
2004; Muñiz and Galindo 2004). The reason to revisit the EF is that the fundamental criticism 
has been neither refuted nor taken into account. 
Our approach allows us to evaluate the robustness of the EF approach by examining how 
it ranks alternative spatial configurations of an economy in comparison with a spatial welfare 
economics analysis. Thus, we hope to fulfill two aims. The first is to contribute to a correct 
interpretation  of  the  meaning  of  spatial  sustainability.  The  second  is  to  show  in  a  formal 
manner that the EF is not a good guide to spatial sustainability. 
The analysis of the spatial dimensions is relevant for two main reasons. First it enables 
the  comprehension  and  operationalization  of  statements  about  sustainability,  notably  by 
distinguishing between sustainable and unsustainable land use, transport and trade. Second, it  
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allows  the  linking of  policy  instruments and  goals to  concrete  strategies concerning trade, 
locations and transport. The welfare analysis can cover both regional and global levels, taking 
into account positive externalities (namely, agglomeration effects), advantages from trade, and 
negative externalities (pollution, noise, etc.) related to the presence of economic activities. The 
inclusion of all these elements in a spatial welfare framework guarantees that outcomes are 
consistent with spatial sustainability. Our approach also generates information about various 
types of land use that allows the calculation of alternative ecological footprints. Comparison of 
these with (regional and global) social welfare (including environmental externalities) for a 
number of spatial configurations will permit a rigorous and systematic evaluation of the EF. 
The remainder of this paper is structured in the following way. Section 2 outlines the 
methodological framework. This includes a description of alternative spatial configurations, i.e. 
spatial  locations and interactions. Section 3 presents a  formal spatial  two-region  economic 
model  with  land  use,  environmental  externalities,  agglomeration  effects,  and  interregional 
trade. Section 4 presents an analytical solution to the reduced form model. Section 5 performs 
numerical exercises that compare welfare and EF for five spatial configurations. Section 6 
concludes. 
 
II.  DESCRIPTION OF THE METHOD 
Here we provide a general description of our approach. It involves a definition of the spatial 
configurations and a formal model. This takes the form of a general equilibrium welfare model 
of a two-region economy. The choice of a formal economic model is somewhat arbitrary. It is 
necessary to make sure that different spatial configurations are as much as possible consistent 
and mutually comparable. The general equilibrium model has the advantage that it includes 
behavioral  responses  and  allows  for  indirect  effects  in  terms  of  intermediate  production, 
consumption, trade, income generation and welfare.  
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The  model  captures  the  environmental  impacts  from  all  activities,  associated  with 
particular land uses and translates these through externalities in welfare effects. Moreover, in 
contrast with EF approach, a number of notions that are important to the analysis of spatial 
sustainability  are  included.  These  are  agglomeration  effects,  advantages  from  trade  and 
negative externalities.  
An  agglomeration  effect  represents  a  certain  type  of  positive  externality.  The  term 
‘agglomeration’ refers to the clustering of economic activities. Agglomeration occurs when all 
goods are produced in close proximity, so that the advantages of economies of scale, minimal 
transport and communication costs, common labor markets and technical know-how can be 
enjoyed  (Brakman,  Garretsen,  and  van  Marrewijk  2001).  As  a  result,  many  intermediate 
commodities and final goods are then available at low cost. Eberts and McMillen (1999) note 
that agglomeration effects are positive externalities caused by the fact that businesses share 
nonexcludable inputs, such as the labor pool and communication networks. 
Trade advantages correspond to the benefits a region gets from trading its products with 
another  region. This includes  comparative  advantage,  which reflects that one  region has a 
higher  relative  productivity  in  one  good  than  another  region,  while  the  reverse  holds  for 
another good (Krugman 1991b). This mechanism causes trade which enhances international 
labor division and specialization. Trade further, leads to more competition between suppliers 
and  therefore  lower  prices  for  consumers,  thus  enhancing  social  welfare  (less  market 
concentration or imperfections). 
An externality arises when the production or welfare of one economic agent (consumer 
or  producer)  is  directly  influenced  by  the  choices  made  by  another  agent.  In  the  case  of 
negative external environmental costs this influence is negative. Individual decisions will then 
not be in line with social welfare and environmental sustainability. The EF takes the negative 
effects of the economy on the environment into account but not as welfare changes through 
external effects. Moreover it omits issues of agglomeration effects and trade advantages.  
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The model we adopt is consistent with the EF in the sense that it covers the same land 
use and consumption categories as included in the EF. These are cropland, grazing land, forest, 
fishing ground, built-up environment and energy land. Our model is kept as simple as possible, 
by assuming that the world can be divided into two regions. This is sufficient to address the 
core features of (sustainable) trade, locations and transport. 
We present alternative spatial configurations of the two-region economy. This economy 
consists  of  two  activities,  namely  agriculture  and  manufacturing.  In  order  to  construct  the 
spatial configurations for the two-region system, we distinguish between three possible spatial 
structures  for  each  region.  One  assumes  a  sort  of  urban  concentration  (agglomeration)  of 
manufacturing activities, a second is more rural in nature (agriculture-dominated), and a third 
is dominated by nature and has a relatively low intensity of economic activity. With these three 
possible regional structures we can in principle compose  9 3
2 = spatial configurations for the 
two-region system. However, some of these are just each others mirror images, so that only six 
configurations turn out to be relevant. Table 1 clarifies these in terms of the combinations of 
the spatial structures in each of the two regions. Note that all activities and pure nature are 
present to some degree in each region under all configurations. 
 
TABLE 1   
POSSIBLE SPATIAL CONFIGURATIONS 
Spatial configuration  Region 1  Region 2 
A  agriculture-dominated area  agriculture-dominated area 
B  agglomeration  agriculture-dominated area 
C  agriculture-dominated area  nature-dominated area 
D  agglomeration  agglomeration 
E  agglomeration  nature-dominated area 




We omit from our analysis spatial configuration F (see Table 1), as it lacks a complete 
economy. This is not a moral judgment that such a system is less desirable, but a consequence 
of using a two-region economic model and assuring that the global (two-region) economies and 
populations under each configuration are identical in size. Under configuration F there is too 
little space available to host the economy and the population, so that a comparison with the 
other configurations would imply comparing apples and oranges. Table 2 shows for each of the 
five remaining configurations how they are characterized in terms of the three core spatial 
economic  phenomena,  i.e.  agglomeration  effect,  negative  externality  and  trade  advantage. 
Figure 1 provides a schematic representation of these five configurations. 
 
TABLE 2 
ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SPATIAL CONFIGURATIONS 
Spatial configuration  Region  Agglomeration Effect  Negative Externalities  Trade Advantage 
1  0  1 
A 
2  0  1 
1 
1  1  1 
B 
2  0  1 
1 
1  0  1 
C 
2  0  1 
1 
1  1  1 
D 
2  1  1 
1 
1  1  1 
E 
2  0  1 
1 
 

















































































III.  THE MODEL 
Here we develop a general equilibrium model that includes all the elements as discussed in the 
previous section. Although it is not our explicit purpose to develop an entirely new model, our 
application requires a number of changes in existing models. Our main objective is to compare 
the EF with the spatial welfare approach in ranking different given spatial configurations. 
To  study  the  relationship  between  spatial  concentrations  at  different  scales  (country, 
region,  or  urban)  and  environmental  (un)sustainability  in  a  way  that  is  consistent  with 
microeconomic theory, we develop a spatial trade model following closely models by Forslid 
and Ottaviano (2003) and van Marrewijk (2005). The first study enables us to use a model that 
can be analytically solved, while the latter suggests how to include negative externalities from 
pollution. These models are variations of a well known model by Krugman (1991a), which 
started a line of research that is known now as the ‘new economic geography’. In addition to 
the trade relations in these models we analyze the positive effects stemming from economies of 
agglomeration and (negative) environmental externalities.  
This literature makes a distinction between short-run and long-run equilibria. Since we 
are  interested  in  assessing  static  spatial  configurations  we  only  consider  the  short-run 
equilibrium, which means that migration between regions is not allowed. This comes down to 
assuming that the stocks of human capital and unskilled labor are exogenously given for each 
region. This restriction is motivated by the intention to stick as close as possible to the EF 
approach, which assumes a given population distribution in space or between regions (i.e., no 
migration). 
The  model  captures  agglomeration  effects.  The  most  significant  advantage  of  the 
agglomeration of economic activities is reduced transport costs due to the reduced transport 
distances.  We  assume  that  intraregional  trade  covers  such  small  distances  relatively  to 
interregional trade that intraregional transport costs are set equal to zero. We do therefore not 
model agglomeration effects endogenously (for example, depending on distances and transport  
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costs),  but  include  them  as  an  exogenous  factor  that  differs  between  the  types  of  spatial 
configuration.  This  is  no  shortcoming,  as  our  intention  is  to  analyze  the  impact  of 
agglomeration rather than explain or derive it theoretically.  
We assume that the world is divided into two regions. Both regions produce two different 
types  of  goods:  a  homogeneous  good  Fj  (agriculture)  and  a  differentiated  good  Mj 
(manufacturing). Following Ottaviano (2001), we also assume that two production factors are 
available in the economy, namely unskilled labor (L) and human capital (H). In our two-region 
system  the  total  amount  of  unskilled  workers  is 2 1 L L L + = ,  while  the  amount  of  skilled 
workers is 2 1 H H H + = .The production activities Fj and Mj (for regions, j = 1,2) generate a 
negative externality (E) that affects both regional and global welfare. Agriculture production is 
characterized by constant returns to scale and perfect competition, and is therefore the ideal 
candidate to represent the numéraire good (namely, we can fix the price of food equal to 1). In 
addition, we assume that transportation costs for food are zero, and that one unit of labor is 
needed to yield one unit of food. This guarantees that the wage of unskilled labor is equal to 
unity. We further assume that the manufacturing sector produces many varieties and that each 
manufacturing firm finds it useful to produce a single unique variety, under increasing returns 
to scale. Therefore, the number of available varieties in each region j, nj, is equal to the number 
of  firms  that  are  active  in  the  same  region.  We  are  able  to  define  a  price  index  (I)  of 
manufactures, in order to treat the various products as a single group.  
 
Demand Side 
Given a certain income level (Yj) that a consumer earns from working in the agriculture or 
manufacturing sector in region j, he has to decide whether to spend it on agricultural (in terms 
of demand, Aj) or on manufactured (Mj) goods. Utility is defined as: 




j j E M A U
- - + = 1
1 ,      2 , 1 = j ,  1 0 < < δ ,  0 ³ θ   
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Here δ is the share of income Yj spent on manufactures, E is the negative externality associated 
with domestic production and transport, and θ represents the intensity of the environmental 
externality in the utility function. 
Concerning the demand for manufactures, let cjj and cjk be the consumption levels of a 
particular variety i that is sold in region j and produced in region j and in region k, respectively. 
Following  Dixit-Stiglitz (1977), we define a constant elasticity of substitution (CES), e, to 
write the aggregate consumption of manufactures M as a function of the consumption cjj, cjk, 
and the N varieties: 
(2)  ( )
( ) ( )
( )













 + = ∫ ∫
e e
e e e e
j j n i kj n i jj j i c i c M ,  { } 2 , 1 , = k j     1 > ε    
Here nj and nk represent the total quantity of available varieties in region j and k, respectively, 
and  N  represents  the  total  amount  of  available  varieties  in  the  two  region  system,  so 
that 2 1 n n N + = . 
Each consumer has to satisfy the following budget constraint: 
(3)  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) j j n i   kj kj   n i   jj jj Y A i c i p i c i p
j j
= + +∫ ∫ Î Î ,    { } 2 , 1 , = k j    
Maximizing utility given in (1) subject to (3) gives consumer demand in region j for a 
variety i produced in region k: 




kj kj Y δ I i p i c
1 - - = ,        { } 2 , 1 , = k j ,    N i ,....., 1 =  
Here Ij is the local price index of all the i manufactures in region j: 
(5)  ( ) ( )
( ) ε /
n i  
ε













 + = ∫ ∫
1 1
1 1  ,    { } 2 , 1 , = k j  
Given skilled workers Hj with the relative wage rate wj, and unskilled workers Lj with the 
numéraire wage as input factors, the income in each region j is generated as follows: 





In this part of the description of the modeling framework, we are interested in defining the 
supply side for manufactures (M) and agriculture goods (F). Each variety of manufactures is 
produced under increasing returns to scale using both unskilled labor L and human capital H. 
The quantity Hj in each region j is only used in fixed amount in the manufacturing sector, while 
the unskilled variable labor Lj intervenes either in agriculture or in manufactured production. 
Fixed  costs  are  based  on  α  units  of  H  and  variable  costs  on  bj  units  of  L  per  unit  of 
manufactured goods. Letting wj be the wage rate for H in region j, we find the total cost  ( ) i j c  
of producing xj (i) of variety i in region j as follows: 
( ) ( ) i x β w α i χ j j j j + = ,          { } 2 , 1 = j ,    N i ,....., 1 =  
We choose the unit of skilled labor, H, such that α = 1. Due to the fixed input necessity 
α, the number of firms in region j, nj, which is exogenously determined in our approach is, 






n = = ,           { } 2 , 1 = j  
  In order to provide the model with a spatial dimension, the assumption that manufactured 
goods  can  be  freely  shipped  between  the  two  regions  is  introduced,  and  that  in  shipment 
transport costs occur. To avoid modeling a separate transportation sector we use the ‘iceberg’ 
form of those kinds of costs, which has been introduced by Samuelson (1952). In particular, if 
one variety i of manufactured goods is shipped from region j to region k, only a fraction, jk T / 1  
will arrive at the destination: the reminder will go ‘melt’ during the shipment. This means that 
if a variety produced in location j is sold in the same region at price pjj, then it will be charged 
in consumption location k a price pjk, which equals: 
(8)  ( ) ( ) jk jj jk T i p i p =  ,          { } 2 , 1 , = k j ,    N i ,....., 1 =   
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Here k is the other region of j in a two-region system, and  1 > jk T  represents the amount of 
manufactured good sent per unit received. We hereafter refer to T to mean that amount. 
  Each manufacturing firm is assumed to produce a single variety under internal returns 
to  scale.  Given its  monopoly  power,  having set α = 1, it  is clear  that  the firm acts  as to 
maximize profit: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) i x β w i c i p i c i p i π j j j jk jk jj jj j - - + = ,   { } 2 , 1 , = k j ,  N i ,....., 1 =  
The total production xj (i) of a firm located in region j is defined by: 
(9)  ( ) ( ) ( ) i Tc i c i x jk jj j + = ,         { } 2 , 1 , = k j ,    N i ,....., 1 =  
Here  Tcjk(i)  represents the supply to  region  k of  variety i produced in  region j.  This total 
production corresponds to that xj appearing above, in the total cost of production function. 
Recalling that pjj(i) is the price of a variety i that is both produced and sold in region j, 
under Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition we have that a profit maximizing firm sets its 
price as a constant mark-up on variable cost: 
(10)  ( ) j jj i p b e
1 1 1 ) (
- - =  ,        { } 2 , 1 , = k j ,    N i ,....., 1 =  
The  parameter  βj  captures  the  agglomeration  effect.  It  is  exogenous  and  may  differ 
between spatial configurations, as has been explained above within this section. A lower value 
means more agglomeration in the respective region. That is, each firm’s productivity increases 
and thus the total cost of producing varieties falls, given a lower βj. Note that this deviates from 
the approaches followed by Forslid and Ottaviano (2003) and by van Marrewijk (2005), in 
which βj is equal among the regions. 
As a consequence of the profit maximization behavior, in both the regions firms will 
entry  and  exit  the  manufacturing  sector  until  the  point  at  which  profits  are  zero,  as 
monopolistic  competition  states  as  an  equilibrium  condition.  Therefore,  recalling  that  the 
parameter for fixed input labor α is assumed to equal unity, by substituting (10) into the profit 










j   ,          { } 2 , 1 = j    
  Production  of  agricultural  good  is  based  on  a  linear  production  function  in  labor. 
Since j j j x n β  unskilled workers are required in the production process, the level of food supply 
in each region j, Fj, is: 
(12)  j j j j j x n β L F - = ,          { } 2 , 1 = j  
  The total amount of manufactures that is shipped from region j to region k equals Tcjk, 
while the shipped amount of agricultural goods zj that is transferred between regions is given 
by the difference between the supply for agricultural goods, Fj and the demand for agricultural 
goods, Aj, in each region j: 
(13)  j j j A F z - = ,            { } 2 , 1 = j  
 
Externalities and Welfare 
Negative externalities (E) are associated with production and transport. Therefore, the negative 
externality can be written as a function of agriculture production (F), manufacture production 
(M), and transportation (t), in the following way: 
(14)  ∑ =
j
j E E , is the global level of environmental degradation, 
where  ( ) t , M , F E E j j j = ,      0 0 0 > ¶ ¶ > ¶ ¶ > ¶ ¶ j t j M j F t E    , M E   , F E
j j j  
Noting  that  externalities  from  transport  are  related  to  the  quantity  of  agriculture  and 
manufacturing products that are shipped between the two regions, we can write: 
(15)  ( ) ( )
d




z z i Tc i Tc



















) ( ) (
1 ,   0 > d , b , a ,  1 = + + d b a  
Here m is a constant, and a,b,d represent the measurement of the relative externality burdens of 
manufacture,  agriculture  and  transport.  This  approach  is  more  general  than  van  Marrewijk  
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(2005), who only considers pollution (externalities). Our approach can address any type of 
environmental externality (e.g. noise, biodiversity loss due to fragmentation of nature, etc.). 
  The welfare function in region j is identical to regional utility (1): 
(16) 
( ) ( )
q d d - - + = E M A W j j j 1
1 ,      { } 2 1, j = ,  1 0 < < δ ,  0 ³ θ  
Global social welfare can then be defined as a weighted geometric mean of the welfare 












j j L n
j
j W W   { } 2 1, j =  
  The  choice  of  multiplicative  factor  is  suggested  by  the  presence  of  environmental 
components in determining the global welfare (Ebert and Welsch 2004). 
 
Land Use  
Since the EF is expressed in terms of land area (ha), a final step of our approach will be to 
translate activities in the economy into land units. This step guarantees that the comparison 
between our approach and the EF is feasible. We adopt a sort of Leontief production function, 
which  does not  allow  for substitution between land on the one hand  and other production 
factors (labor and capital) on the other. This is not severely restrictive given that we exclude 
dynamic processes, notably technical progress. The latter is conform the EF procedure, which 
considers sustainability scenarios based on available technologies, leaving out considerations 
of advanced or hypothetical technologies (e.g., solar PV rather than land-intensive forestation 
to solve the problem of global warming).  
  Given that our two production sectors completely cover the EF categories as explained in 
section 2, we can establish the following set of relationships defining land use: 
(18) 
η
j j , crops A γ l = ,          1 £ η       { } 2 , 1 = j  
(19) 
ο





j j , forest A λ l = ,          1 £         { } 2 , 1 = j  
(21) 
j aggl
j j , built Pop ν l = ,        2 = ν  ,  { } 1 , 5 . 0 Î aggl ,  { } 2 , 1 = j  
(22) 
y x j j fishing A l = , ,          1 £ ψ       { } 2 , 1 = j  
(23) 
j aggl
j j j j , al hypothetic Pop ω M σ F φ l + + = ,    0 > ω , σ , φ     { } 2 , 1 = j  
Here  the  terms  lcategory,j  on  the  left-hand-side  of  each  equation  represents  the  land  used  to 
produce those goods expressed by each sub-index in the EF. Instead, the first indexes on the 
right-hand-side are parameters that homogenize the units of measure, while the power indexes 
show the non-linear trend of the function. Concerning (21), aggl is the agglomeration effect, 
and takes values equal to 1 when agglomeration occurs, and equal to 0.5 when it does not. Popj 
represents the size of region j and is calculated as follows: ( ) j j j H L Pop + = 3 . 
Equation (23) represents ‘energy land’ use. The first two terms on the right-hand side of 
this equation represent the energy use by production, while the last term refers to residential 
energy use. We assume in line with Wackernagel and Rees (1996) that energy land is the land 
required to capture CO2 emissions of fossil fuel combustion by forestation. As it does not deal 
with real land use, we call it hypothetical land. 
The set of equations (18) to (22) corresponds to ‘real’ – as opposed to ‘hypothetical’ – 
land use. The sum of all ‘real’ land uses gives us total ‘real’ land use  j R l ,  in region j, as 
follows. 
(24)  j , fishing j , built j , forest j , grazing j , crops j , R l l l l l l + + + + =  ,  { } 2 , 1 = j  
We assume that a fraction of natural land is always present in both regions: 
(25)  j , R
ions configurat   spatial
j , nature l    Max l > ,        { } 2 , 1 = j ,  0 , > j nature l     
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Here lnature, j is the area covered by nature in each region j. This in fact defines the total land use 
of region j (namely as equal to the maximum of lR,j + lnature,j over all spatial configurations).
1 
  The sum of all land uses, including therefore energy land, gives the EFj, ecological 
footprint of region j (in ha), as from Wackernagel and Rees (1996). We refer to it as EFj
1 to 
distinguish it from an alternative EF approach, EFj
2 (van Vuuren and Bouwman 2005). 
(26)  j , al hypothetic j , R j l l EF + =
1  ,        { } 2 , 1 = j  
(27)   j , fishing j , al hypothetic j j l l EF EF - - =
1 2  ,      { } 2 , 1 = j  
This completes the model. 
 
IV.  ANALYTICAL RESULTS 
In this section, we provide an analytical solution to the model described in the previous section. 
We start by arguing that the Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition imposes that each firm’s 
profits equal zero at equilibrium. Therefore, recalling that the parameter for fixed input labor α 
is assumed equal to one, by substituting (10) into profit function pj (i) and setting pj = 0 we 















j   ,      2 , 1 = j  
    Then we define the analytical equations for the equilibrium. We introduce it by showing 
the market clearing condition for the production of a variety of manufactures in region j. 
  By substituting (8) and (10) in (4) the price index Ij can be written as follows: 
(29)  ( )
( ) ε / ε
k k
ε ε




- - - - +
-
=
1 1 1 1 1
1
,     { } 2 , 1 , = k j  
                                                       
1 The presence of agriculture land use in both regions is based on Forslid and Ottaviano’s work (2003), which 




By substituting (4), (8), (10), and (29) in (9) the level of production of firms located in 





























j β n β n T
Y
δ T










,  { } 2 , 1 , = k j  
Here k is the other region of j in the two-region system (j, k). 
  We assume unskilled workers to be evenly spread between the two regions, so that  
(31)  2 / L L j = ,            2 , 1 = j  
  Using (7) and recalling that in our model the number of firms in each region j, nj, is 
exogenously determined, income Yj in region j is calculated from equation (6), as follows: 
(32)  2 / L n w Y j j j + =           2 , 1 = j  
  The reduced form model can now be expressed as follows: 
(10)  ( ) ( ) j jj β ε i p
1 1 1





































j β n β n T
Y
δ T










,  2 , 1 = j  
(32)  2 / L n w Y j j j + = ,          2 , 1 = j  
  By substituting (32) into (30) and the resulting into (11) we obtain two linear equations in 
two variables, w1 and w2, which can be analytically solved. The solutions are: 
(33)  ( )
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Now we have an explicit solution for wj in the exogenous parameters. Substituting this in 
(32) gives a solution for Yj, while substituting it in (11) gives a solution for xj. In turn, all other 




V.  NUMERICAL ANALYSIS 
Although  we  have  achieved  an  analytical  solution  for  the  model,  a  generalized  analytical 
comparison of EF and spatial welfare is not possible. The reason is that the explicit expressions 
in  parameters  of both EF and spatial  welfare  are extremely complicated. We are therefore 
forced to employ numerical methods of further analysis. This is no problem as we intend to 
find  one  or  more  counter  examples,  i.e.  inconsistent  rankings  of  spatial  configurations 
according to EF and spatial welfare. Note that the analytical model solution obtained in the 
previous section allows us to perform numerical analysis without having to solve a complex, 
nonlinear system of equations. To numerically assess the ranking of different configurations 
we use realistic ranges – as motivated below – of parameter values, for both economic and land 
use  parameters.  Nonetheless,  it  is  not  our  purpose  to  perform  real  world  application.  The 
following sub-sections provide information on the exact procedure followed. 
 
Economic Parameters 
The base economic parameter values are chosen to fall in realistic empirical ranges. Most of 
them are based on van Marrewijk (2005). Only the parameters that relate to the concentration 
of manufacturing firms in each region j, namely nj and βj, assume arbitrary values (without 
harming the generality of our counter example). The parameter βj is set equal to 1 in the case of 
de-concentration  of  firms,  while  it  equals  0.5  if  agglomeration  occurs  in  region  j.  For  the 
nature-dominated region (in configurations C and E), βj is assumed equal to 2. This value is 
arbitrarily chosen to reflect the higher costs a firm incurs in producing goods in region 2 due to 
the absence of agglomeration of production activities. Concerning the total number of firms 
that  are  active  in  both  the  regions  1  and  2,  we  use  the  normalization  factor,  such 
that 1 2 1 = + = n n N . The parameters n1 and n2 are both equal to 0.5, except for configurations 
that involve a nature-dominated region, in which case n1 = 0.8 and n2 = 0.2. Furthermore, the  
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total  number  of  unskilled  workers  L  is  normalized  to  1,  such  that  Lj  =  0.5  represents  the 
number of the available unskilled workers in each region j. 
 
Land Use Parameters 
Next we set the exogenous parameters appearing in the land use equations, (18) to (23). Two 
types of parameters characterize each land use equation. A first type of parameters is the set of 
superscript parameters. A second type refers to the first parameters on the right-hand side of 
each land use equation.  
  The parameters of the first type express the non-linearity of the relationship between 
the volume of production for a particular consumption category and the land needed to support 
it. Concerning the second type, they have to be interpreted as the efficiency rate of (agricultural 
or manufacturing) production. In order to derive their values, we follow Wackernagel and Rees 
(1996). We first estimate world production (in metric tons, Mt) for each of the food products 
associated with particular land use categories. Data from FAOSTAT (FAO 2002) are used. 
Then we proceed to calculate the land required to support the production of one metric ton of 
food products for these same categories, based on data from WWF (2002). The obtained value 
is in ha/Mt. Similarly, the value of parameter n in equation (21) is calculated dividing the 
global built-up surface through the world population, in order to find the per-capita land use of 
this type (in ha/capita). 
Concerning the estimate of parameter values for the hypothetical land in (23) (i.e φ,σ,ω), 
we utilize data from the FAOSTAT (FAO 2002) for world agricultural production (expressed 
in million dollars per unit of world GDP), from the World Development Indicators (World 
Bank 2004) for world manufacturing production (expressed in million dollars per unit of world 
GDP), and from World Energy Outlook (IEA 2002) for estimates of CO2 emissions from fuel 
combustion  by  sector  of  production  (i.e.  emissions  from  agricultural,  manufacturing  and 
residential sectors, all expressed in million tons of CO2). By dividing CO2 emissions caused by  
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agriculture, manufacturing and residential sectors through world agricultural production, world 
manufacturing production and the world population, respectively, we obtain three coefficients 
expressing the emissions associated with normalized production units for each sector (i.e. in 
tons of CO2/dollars, tons of CO2/dollars, and tons of CO2/capita, respectively). To derive the 
land needed to absorb the emissions per unit of output from the economic sectors, we apply the 
conversion factor by Wackernagel and Rees (1996), which is equal to 0.56 (i.e. 1/1.8) ha per 
ton of CO2. Finally, the values for φ,σ,ω in (23) are derived by dividing the conversion factor 
through the emissions generated by each sector’s production activity (φ,σ,ω are then expressed 
in ha/dollars, ha/dollars, and ha/ capita, respectively). 
The resulting values of economic and land use parameters are shown in Table 3. 
 
TABLE 3 
OVERVIEW OF PARAMETER VALUES 
Economic Parameter  Value  Land use Parameter  Value 
θ  0.1  Η    0.5 
d  0.3  ζ (ha/tons
ο)    3.76 
ε  3  ο    1 
a  0.5  λ (ha/tons
 )    4.86 
b  0.3       1 
d  0.2  ν (ha/capita
aggl)    0.1 
β  > 0  aggl    0.5; 1 
α  1  x (ha/tons
ψ)  17.7 
T  1.79  y    1 
nj  1 0 £ £ j n   σ (ha/dollars)    0.00011 
L  1  φ (ha/dollars)    0.00054 





Results and Discussion 
This sub-section is aimed at comparing rankings of the five spatial configurations on the basis 
of welfare and EF (for two types of EF). We determine the results at both the regional and the 
world level. The configuration showing the highest value of welfare and the lowest value of EF 
is ranked as first (i.e. higher welfare and lower footprint are desirable). The results are reported 
in Table 4.  
 
TABLE 4 
  RANKING OF THE SPATIAL CONFIGURATIONS ACCORDING TO WELFARE AND FOOTPRINT 
Approach  Spatial configuration ranking 
(1: most favorable; 5: least favorable) 
  1  2  3  4  5 
SWE  D  B  E  C  A 
EF
1  C  A  B  E  D 
EF
2  C  A  B  E  D 
 
  The most important finding is that the welfare evaluation ranks alternatives differently 
than evaluation based on the two EF indicators. A second finding is that the two EF approaches 
give rise to identical rankings, even though the (absolute) values of EF
1 and EF
2 differ (see 
Appendix 1 for an example of the magnitude of these differences). This outcome is remarkable, 
given  that  the  second  EF  indicator  (EF
2)  is  the  result  of  an  effort  to  improve  the  original 
(Wackernagel and Rees) EF method (EF
1). We have examined whether this result holds for 
different parameter values, and it turned out to be a very robust result. One explanation is that 
hypothetical  land  use  and  real  land  use  are  very  much  correlated  in  the  configurations 
considered, which is also true for industrialized countries in the real world.  
  Further insights can be obtained by interpreting the specific rankings according to welfare 
and  EF  criteria.  This  shows  that  –  under  limited  externality  effects  –  starting  from  any  
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configuration, changing a region structure to an agglomeration contributes positively to global 
welfare and negatively to global ecological footprint.
2 The reason is that in terms of the welfare 
criterion  the  extra  positive  externality  of  agglomeration  dominates  the  extra  negative 
environmental externality associated with it. When the externality effect becomes large relative 




Above we have focused the attention on global evaluation of welfare and EF. However, many 
footprint studies have focused the attention on regional rather than global analysis of EF.  
 
TABLE 5                                                                                                                     
  RANKING OF THE SPATIAL CONFIGURATIONS AT A REGIONAL LEVEL 
Approach  Region  Spatial configuration ranking per regional performance 
(1: most favorable; 5: least favorable) 
    1  2  3  4  5 
Region 1  E  B  D  C  A 
SWE 
Region 2  D  B  A  E  C 
Region 1  A  D  B  C  E 
EF
1 
Region 2  E  C  B  A  D 
Region 1  A  D  B  C  E 
EF
2 
Region 2  E  C  B  A  D 
                                                       
2 For example, from an EF perspective, configuration A performs always better than B, while the opposite holds 




  What can we on the basis of our results say about this. The results in Table 5 show that in 
general regional and global welfare evaluation will not render the same rankings.
3  This 
indicates  that  regional  evaluation  is  partial  in  nature  from  an  overall  welfare  perspective. 
Global evaluation is therefore to be preferred. 
4 
 
Sensitivity Analysis  
Next we perform a sensitivity analysis. The two crucial parameters to be examined are nj, the 
number of firms that are active in each region j, and the parameterq, which represents the 
intensity of the environmental externality. With regard to the first parameters, we consider as 
an alternative setting n1 = 0.6 and n2 = 0.4 for configurations C and E, to reflect a different 
degree of concentration in the nature-dominated region. This evidently is an important element 
of the debate on spatial sustainability. This changes the global rankings according to welfare 





                                                       
3 By the way, the rankings based on the global and regional EF’s differ as well. To see this for EF
1: Configuration 
A is regarded as optimal for region 1, and configuration E for region 2. However, configuration C is optimal from 
the global EF perspective. 
 
4 Our findings do not exclude that isolated regions function as autarkic economic systems. In fact, certain isolated 
islands on an (un)sustainable track behave as ‘global systems’, and have for this reason been suggested – rightly 





RANKING OF THE SPATIAL CONFIGURATIONS, NEW SCENARIO  
(n1=0.6; n2=0.4, IN CONFIGURATIONS C AND E) 
Approach 
Spatial configuration ranking 
(1: most favorable; 5: least favorable) 
  1  2  3  4  5 
SWE  D  E  B  A  C 
EF
1  C  A  B  E  D 
EF
2  C  A  B  E  D 
 
In  particular  we  find  completely  opposed  rankings  between  the  two  approaches,  when  the 
regions are less asymmetric in terms of degree of concentration. Moreover it changes rankings 
based on regional EF (not regional welfare). So the results have proved fully robust with regard 
to the values set for these parameters. 
 
TABLE 7 
RANKING OF THE SPATIAL CONFIGURATIONS, NEW SCENARIO (θ=120) 
Approach  Spatial configuration ranking 
(1: most favorable; 5: least favorable) 
   1  2  3  4  5 
SWE  C  A  B  E  D 
EF
1  C  A  B  E  D 
EF
2  C  A  B  E  D 
 
We then increase the value of q from 0.1 through 0.9 to 120, which changes the intensity 
of the environmental externality. The results reported in Table 7 show that welfare and EFs 
rankings  converge.  This  makes  sense  as  for  sufficiently  high  θ  environmental  externalities 
completely dominate welfare. Under these circumstances environmental externalities are no  
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longer kept in balance by agglomeration and trade effects. The welfare analysis thus boils 
down to a one-dimensional environmental EF analysis. 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
In  the  large  literature  on  sustainability  and  sustainable  development  the  aspect  of  spatial 
sustainability  has  not  received  much  attention.  As  a  result,  thinking  about  the  sustainable 
development of regions, sustainable transport, sustainable location policy and sustainable trade 
policy has tended to be ad hoc. 
The ecological  footprint is a good example of this, as  follows from  our comparative 
analysis. Using a formal model it has been shown with a number of counter examples that 
welfare rankings can be inconsistent with rankings based on the ecological footprint (for two 
specific  types  of  footprint  indicator).  It  has  been  argued  that  the  spatial  model  should  be 
regarded  as  a  quite  reliable  theoretical  guide  to  spatial  sustainability,  as  it  covers  trade 
advantages,  agglomeration  effects,  and  environmental  externalities.  By  implication,  the 
ecological footprint is not a reliable guide to spatial sustainability. 
The  conclusion  is  that  global  welfare  evaluation  is  preferred  when  analyzing  spatial 
sustainability  and  sustainable  trade  issues.  The  global  and  especially  regional  ecological 
footprint do not provide information that is useful from the perspective of welfare enhancing 
sustainable  development.  It  has  further  been  shown  that  only  in  the  case  in  which 
environmental  externalities  dominate  agglomeration  and  trade,  EF  and  spatial  welfare 
evaluation are  identical.  Evidently, this is not a  very  realistic depiction  of a reality that is 
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OVERVIEW OF THE RESULTS FOR THE THREE ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES 
Spatial configuration  Region/World  SWE (Meu)
5  EF
1 (ha)  EF
2 (ha) 
1  0.24  10.82  3.59 
2  0.24  10.82  3.59  A 
1+2    0.241  21.64  7.18 
1
  0.30  11.70  3.89 
2  0.25  10.30  3.42  B 
1+2  0.27  22.02  7.31 
1  0.27  11.70  3.90 
2  0.20    9.89  3.28  C 
1+2    0.243  21.60  7.18 
1  0.29  11.20  3.72 
2  0.29  11.20  3.72  D 
1+2  0.29  22.40  7.44 
1  0.33  12.50  4.13 
2  0.23    9.77  3.25  E 
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